Antimony is the smallest market on any critical-minerals list — and the first one to blow up. A brittle, silvery metalloid, it keeps aircraft seats and circuit boards from burning, hardens the lead in every bullet and battery grid, and clarifies the glass on solar panels. China mines more of it than anyone, smelts far more, and in 2024 turned that grip into a weapon: export licences in September, then an outright ban on sales to the United States in December. Prices roughly quintupled. This site tracks where antimony is mined, roasted and consumed, how a metal most people can't name became a superpower bargaining chip, and the West's scramble to rebuild a supply chain it let rust for thirty years — using open data from USGS, BGS, trade statistics and price agencies.
Mines and gold-antimony operations, roasters and smelters, idled assets and the development wave — from the Hunan veins that armed two world wars to the Idaho project the Pentagon is paying to reopen. Tap a marker for details; toggle layers below. Circle size ≈ scale of operation.
Antimony rarely trades as shiny metal: it moves as sulphide concentrate, as the white trioxide powder blended into plastics, as an invisible hardener inside lead, and as a military-spec sulphide that ignites primers. Each form has its own buyers, its own price — and, since 2024, its own export-control code. Tap a stage.
From a stibnite vein in Hunan — or a gold mine in Siberia, Victoria or Idaho — to the circuit board that doesn't catch fire and the cartridge that does. Increasingly, antimony arrives as a passenger in gold ore: the gold pays for the mine, and the antimony comes along as strategic freight.
Mining antimony is the easy half. Turning stibnite concentrate into the trioxide that goes into plastics — or the 99.65% metal ingot the market prices — happens in roasters and reduction furnaces that the West spent decades closing. China dominates that middle step, which is why even non-Chinese concentrate has usually had to pass through Chinese hands.
Xikuangshan in Hunan — "the world's antimony capital", mined since 1897 — anchors a smelting complex (Hsikwangshan Twinkling Star, under China Minmetals) rated at ~30,000 t/yr of refined antimony and ~40,000 t/yr of antimony products, exporting to 50+ countries. Guangxi and Yunnan host the rest of a belt that processes imported ore, too.
SPMP's roaster in Oman's Sohar Free Zone — built for ~20,000 t/yr of antimony plus by-product gold, precisely to break the Chinese tolling monopoly — has sat idle since early 2024 for want of concentrate, and as of August 2026 is looking for a buyer or operating partner. The West's spare smelting capacity exists; it just has nothing to feed it.
United States Antimony runs the only operating smelter in the US at Thompson Falls, Montana — mid-expansion toward 300–400 tons a month — plus the restarted Madero smelter in Mexico. Until Perpetua's Stibnite mine arrives, they run on imported and purchased feed: America can smelt antimony, it just doesn't mine any.
Nyrstar's Port Pirie lead smelter in South Australia poured its first antimony metal in November 2025 and is ramping toward 2,000 t/yr (potentially 5,000 t by 2028) — recovered from the lead circuit, backed by A$105M in government support, and Australia's only source of finished antimony metal.
Antimony demand is unglamorous and stubborn: fire-safety rules don't relax when prices quintuple, cars still need lead-acid batteries to start, and every new solar panel needs clarified glass. That inelasticity is precisely what made the market such an effective pressure point.
Antimony trioxide makes halogenated flame retardants work — in circuit boards, cable sheathing, vehicle seats, aircraft interiors and building plastics. Fire-safety codes wrote it into the modern world, and USGS notes substitutes generally cost performance. Demand moves with regulation, not price.
Sodium antimonate fines and clarifies the high-transmittance glass on photovoltaic panels. Solar glass was the fastest-growing antimony use of the 2020s — one reason China, the world's solar factory, became a net importer of antimony ore even while restricting exports of the processed forms.
Antimonial lead stiffens the grids in lead-acid batteries — still the battery that starts nearly every combustion car, backs up telecom towers and powers forklifts. It is also antimony's circular loop: recycled battery lead returns much of its antimony to the pool, the closest thing the West has to domestic supply.
Antimony was the test shot of the critical-minerals trade war: the first metal China banned outright for one named country. The sequence — licence, ban, spike, truce — is now the template every other export-controlled mineral is read against.
World mine output slides from ~174,000 t to ~118,000 t (BGS) as China's flagship deposits age: Xikuangshan's grades fall, environmental inspections idle Hunan and Guangxi operations, and Chinese smelters begin importing ore from Myanmar, Tajikistan and Russia to stay fed. Rotterdam drifts around $11,000–13,000/t — cheap enough that nobody in the West notices the floor thinning.
China announces dual-use export controls on antimony — ores, oxides, metal, hydrides and smelting technology — effective 15 September, citing national security. It is the third strike after gallium/germanium (2023) and graphite: every licence now passes through MOFCOM. Rotterdam, already at records near $25,000/t on the shrinking supply base, keeps climbing as buyers panic-order ahead of the deadline.
Responding to new US chip sanctions, China bans exports of antimony, gallium and germanium to the United States outright — the first time it names a single country. US imports from China, 63% of American supply in recent years, collapse ~97% between August and December. The Rotterdam price ends the year around $39,000–40,000/t, roughly triple January's level.
Rotterdam grinds up to roughly $60,000/t by late spring (~$27.50/lb in the US market, per trade-press assessments) while China's domestic price lags tens of thousands of dollars below — a spread that makes a tonne of antimony worth smuggling. Reuters documents surging "Thai" and "Mexican" antimony flows into the US; Beijing answers with a May transshipment crackdown. Inside China, the squeeze is real too: by June, 45% of surveyed smelters are at zero output for want of ore.
The rebuild stops being a slide deck: Perpetua gets its Forest Service notice to proceed (19 Sep) and breaks ground at Stibnite (21 Oct) after posting $139M in financial assurance; Nova Minerals wins a $43.4M Pentagon award for Alaskan antimony (2 Oct); US Antimony lands a ~$245M sole-source DLA contract to restock the National Defense Stockpile — then bids ~A$720M for Australia's Larvotto and is rebuffed within a week.
After the Trump–Xi meeting, Beijing suspends the US-specific ban on antimony, gallium and germanium until 27 November 2026 — a suspension, not a repeal, with the September 2024 licensing regime still standing for every buyer. Days later, Nyrstar pours Australia's first antimony metal at Port Pirie. The price eases off its highs but settles at multiples of the pre-control level.
Australia unveils a A$1.2B Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve with antimony explicitly prioritised (12 Jan), including A$185M for physical stockpiles. Talco Gold's 20,000 t/yr smelter in Tajikistan — a TALCO–Tibet Huayu joint venture — nears completion; Kyrgyzstan begins a phased relaunch of the Soviet-era Kadamjay combine; Alkane signs an earn-in over Nagambie, Australia's highest-grade resource.
EXIM's board approves a $2.9B, 13-year loan for Stibnite (21 May) — the bank's fourth-largest ever — and courts wave construction on (injunction denied 29 May, stay denied 17 June, appeals still running). The US Army and Idaho National Laboratory cut the ribbon on a military-spec antimony trisulfide pilot plant (29 Jul). In New South Wales, Larvotto's Hillgrove starts commissioning (21 Jul) with first production due within days as August ends. Not everything goes the West's way: Slovakia cancels the licence over the EU's largest antimony resource (May), Oman's idle roaster goes up for sale (Aug) — and prices ease to $25,000–31,000/t by mid-2026, still roughly double the pre-control level.
Antimony has no exchange contract: the market runs on price-agency assessments — Rotterdam in dollars, China in yuan — and on bilateral deals for concentrate. Since 2024 the defining feature has been the spread: what a tonne is worth inside China versus what the cut-off West will pay for it.
Regulus-grade 99.65% antimony metal, assessed in-warehouse Rotterdam by the price agencies, is the number contracts reference. No LME contract, thin liquidity, few sellers: when the ban hit, the "price" was whatever the last desperate trade printed — which is how a sleepy metal quintupled.
Inside China the same metal trades in yuan at a persistent discount to Rotterdam — at the 2025 extreme, less than half the Western price. That spread is the export-control premium made visible, and it hands a windfall to anyone who can move metal across the line: legally with a licence, or otherwise.
Mines sell 45–60% concentrate to smelters at a payable percentage of the metal price. With Chinese smelters short of ore — 45% of them at zero output in mid-2025 — payables rose even as Beijing restricted what could leave. New non-Chinese supply (Hillgrove, Stibnite) is contracted years ahead: Wogen took Larvotto's first seven years.
Trade data tells the enforcement story: after December 2024, US imports "from Thailand" and "from Mexico" surged past historical totals while direct Chinese flows died — classic transshipment, documented by Reuters and answered by Beijing's May 2025 crackdown. Vietnam, which mines ~220 t a year, became the No. 2 supplier of antimony metal to the US. Every spread this wide builds its own pipeline.
Tajikistan mined ~22,000 t of antimony in 2025 — a fifth of world supply, up from ~11,000 t a decade ago — from the US-owned Anzob combine (Comsup Commodities, >$300M invested) and the Talco Gold joint venture at Konchoch. It now supplies ~42% of the EU's antimony imports. But the fastest-growing processing capacity there is the new 20,000 t/yr Talco Gold smelter — a 50/50 venture with China's Tibet Huayu Mining. Even the diversification story has a Chinese partner.
China's mine share has actually fallen — from three-quarters of world output in the mid-2010s to under 40% as its deposits age. Its leverage never did: the smelting, the trioxide plants, the price discovery and the export rules all still run through Beijing, and imported ore from Myanmar, Russia and Central Asia keeps the furnaces fed.
of the world's antimony smelting and processing is commonly attributed to China (industry and government estimates). Its share along the chain:
Antimony's military résumé is older than the periodic table — kohl in pharaohs' eyeliner, Gutenberg's type metal, shrapnel hardener in two world wars. Almost every conventional round fired today contains it three times over: in the hardened lead, in the primer, in the tracer. That is why a metal with a market smaller than a mid-size gold miner gets Pentagon money and its own line in export-control law.
Pure lead is too soft to fly true: bullets and shot are hardened with 2–8% antimony, and armour-piercing designs use more. Antimony trisulfide — made to the US military's MIL-A-22131 spec, minimum 70% Sb — is the friction igniter in primers and percussion caps; antimony compounds burn in tracer rounds. No antimony, no ammunition plant.
Indium antimonide (InSb) is the classic mid-wave infrared detector material — missile seekers, thermal sights, satellite sensors — and antimony-based semiconductors (GaSb, InSb superlattices) underpin modern night-vision focal planes. High-purity antimony also dopes silicon throughout the chip industry.
When Japan cut off Chinese antimony — Hunan then supplied most of the world — the US turned a remote Idaho gold district into a war plant: Stibnite produced 90% of America's antimony and 40% of its tungsten in 1941–45. The deposit the Pentagon is now spending billions to reopen is the same one that armed the last world war.
The National Defense Stockpile sold down its Cold-War antimony long ago. Now the Defense Logistics Agency is buying again: a ~$245M sole-source contract with US Antimony (2025) with ~$75M of deliveries planned for 2026 — while the FY2024 NDAA bars Chinese antimony from defence supply chains from 2027, giving procurement officers a hard deadline.
Mining antimony is not enough — military primers need trisulfide to spec, and the US hasn't made it domestically in decades. In July 2026 the US Army, Idaho National Laboratory and Perpetua opened a containerised pilot plant processing a ton of ore a day into military-spec antimony trisulfide, the prototype for closing the last gap in the chain.
Antimony sits on the US, EU, UK, Japanese, Indian and Australian critical-minerals lists; Australia's new A$1.2B strategic reserve names it in the first tranche. The EU imports ~42% of its antimony from Tajikistan; the US relies on imports for ~85% of consumption. Every ally is now short the same small metal.
For thirty years no Western banker would finance an antimony mine: the market was too small, the price too Chinese. The ban inverted the logic — now governments underwrite the projects and the constraint is time, not money. Presented as observation, not investment advice.
Perpetua's Stibnite is the West's flagship: a $2.9B EXIM loan (approved May 2026, the bank's fourth-largest ever), >$80M in Pentagon funding, $317M in equity from Agnico Eagle and JPMorganChase, and construction underway toward 2029 production covering ~35% of US antimony demand — with gold paying most of the bills and litigation still trailing the permits.
Larvotto took Hillgrove from acquisition (Dec 2023) to commissioning (Jul 2026) on A$60M of equity and a US$105M bond — with Wogen contracted for seven years of antimony and first production due as August 2026 ends. At ~5,000 t/yr it would be ~7% of world supply, and it made Larvotto a takeover target: US Antimony's ~A$720M approach was rejected in October 2025.
Processing, not mining, is the bottleneck — so capital is chasing furnaces: US Antimony's Montana expansion (toward 300–400 tons/month) and Mexican restart, its 49% hydrometallurgical JV with Americas Gold and Silver, Nyrstar's government-backed Port Pirie antimony circuit, and Talco Gold's 20,000 t/yr Tajik smelter. Whoever owns conversion capacity taxes the whole chain.
Governments have become the demand floor: the DLA's ~$245M stockpile contract, Australia's A$185M physical reserve, the Pentagon's DPA Title III awards ($43.4M to Nova Minerals, $59M+ to Perpetua), and EXIM's project lending. In a 110,000-tonne market, a single state purchase programme moves the price.
Behind the leaders, a crowd of gold-antimony juniors is being repriced as strategic: Southern Cross Gold's Sunday Creek (63–95 kt of Sb in its exploration target, decline under construction), Alkane's Costerfield-plus-Nagambie consolidation in Victoria, Black Cat's Mt Clement, Felix Gold and Nova in Alaska, Military Metals in Slovakia and Nova Scotia. Most are years from a saleable tonne.
Every one is a mirror of the upside: if Beijing extends the truce past November 2026 and licences flow, the price that justifies the rebuild deflates; a 110 kt market can only absorb a few Hillgroves before it's oversupplied; most new "antimony" projects are really gold projects whose antimony arrives only if the gold works; and litigation still shadows Stibnite. The trade is a bet on the ban's shadow outlasting the ban.
A state-owned Chinese complex at the top, two sanctioned-adjacent giants in Russia and Central Asia's quiet champions in the middle — and a fast-moving pack of Western developers racing the calendar at the bottom. Filter by segment or search.
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Mostly for stopping fires and starting cars: antimony trioxide is the synergist that makes brominated flame retardants work in electronics, cables, vehicle interiors and building materials, and antimonial lead hardens the grids of lead-acid batteries. The rest goes into PET plastic (as the polymerisation catalyst in most of the world's bottles), high-clarity glass for solar panels, semiconductors and infrared detectors — and munitions, where antimony hardens bullets, ignites primers and lights tracer rounds.
China — about 40,000 of the roughly 110,000 tonnes mined worldwide in 2025 (USGS estimates via trade press), down from around 100,000 tonnes a year in the mid-2010s as its flagship deposits age. Russia and Tajikistan follow; together the three control more than 85% of world mine supply. The grip is even tighter downstream: China dominates the roasting and smelting that turns concentrate into trioxide and metal.
A shrinking supply base met an export weapon. World mine production had already fallen by roughly a third since 2018 when China imposed export licensing on antimony in September 2024 and then, on 3 December 2024, banned exports to the United States outright. Rotterdam prices went from around $12,000 a tonne in early 2024 to roughly $60,000 in the spring of 2025 — about a fivefold rise — while US imports from China collapsed by 97% in late 2024.
Partially. After the Trump–Xi meeting of October 2025, China suspended its US-specific export ban on antimony, gallium and germanium from November 2025 until 27 November 2026. But the suspension is not a repeal: the underlying dual-use export-licensing regime introduced in September 2024 still applies to every buyer, licences remain slow and selective, and flows to the US have not returned to pre-ban levels.
Not imminently, but antimony has one of the thinnest reserve cushions of any strategic mineral: roughly 2 million tonnes of reserves against ~110,000 tonnes of annual mine production — under two decades at current rates, concentrated in China, Russia and Bolivia. The offsets are gold: much of the new supply arriving in Australia, the US and Tajikistan comes from gold-antimony ores where gold pays the bills — and recycling, since antimonial lead from old batteries is remelted into new ones.
Almost every round of conventional ammunition contains it: antimony hardens lead bullets and shot, antimony trisulfide ignites the primer, and antimony compounds light tracer rounds. It is also in night-vision optics (indium antimonide infrared detectors), and in the flame retardants in every vehicle and vessel. During the Second World War the Stibnite district in Idaho produced 90% of America's antimony; today the Pentagon is spending more than $80 million — plus a $2.9 billion EXIM loan — to reopen that same district by 2029.
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