Uranium is the densest fuel on Earth — and the most politically supervised commodity in it. Mining is spread across five continents, but every kilogram of reactor fuel must pass through a handful of conversion and enrichment plants, nearly half of them Russian. This site tracks where uranium is mined, converted and enriched, and how AI power deals, a US–Russia decoupling and record fuel prices are redrawing the map — using open data from the WNA, IAEA, EIA and BGS.
Major producing mines, conversion, enrichment and fuel-fabrication plants, disrupted operations and development projects. Tap a marker for details; toggle layers below. Circle size ≈ scale of operation.
Uranium trades in a ladder of forms — from rock holding a gram of metal per kilogram to ceramic pellets that each match a tonne of coal. Every rung is a separate market with its own price, and the chokepoints sit between the rungs. Tap a stage.
From wellfields in the Kazakh steppe to a reactor core running for two years without refuelling, uranium passes through a chain where the geography narrows at every step — and where the last two steps are the most contested.
Uranium mining spans five continents — no fuel can skip the midstream. Five plants convert yellowcake to gas, four companies enrich virtually all of it, and Russia's Rosatom alone holds about 43% of world enrichment capacity. With a US import ban going absolute in 2028, the West is building centrifuges faster than at any time since the Cold War.
Four enrichment complexes give Russia ~27.1M SWU a year — about 43% of world capacity — plus conversion at Seversk. Russia was still the single largest enrichment supplier to both US and EU reactors in 2025: 26% of US enrichment purchases and 22.6% of EU deliveries (EIA; Euratom Supply Agency).
The US ban on Russian enriched uranium (signed May 2024) allows waivers only until 1 January 2028. Russia counter-restricted exports to the US in November 2024. DOE has deferred decisions on 2026–27 waivers — utilities are contracting around a hard deadline with no slack.
Urenco is expanding all four sites and broke ground on a 2.1M-SWU plant at Eunice, New Mexico in August 2026 (~+50% US capacity); Orano is extending Georges Besse II ~30% and planning a ~$5B plant at Oak Ridge; Centrus is building LEU centrifuges in Ohio; startup General Matter took over Paducah. DOE seeded it all with $2.7B in January 2026.
Most advanced and small modular reactors need high-assay LEU (5–20%) — a fuel only Russia's TENEX sold commercially until Centrus's Piketon plant delivered America's first kilograms in 2023, reaching 900 kg by January 2026. DOE has allocated ~21 t to eight developers; Urenco's Capenhurst HALEU line follows in the early 2030s.
After a lost post-Fukushima decade, uranium demand is rising on every front at once: 441 operable reactors with 79 under construction, tech giants signing decade-long power deals, thirty-plus countries pledged to triple nuclear capacity — and the World Bank financing it again for the first time since 1959.
Microsoft's 20-year deal to restart Three Mile Island (Sept 2024) opened the floodgates: Meta–Constellation and Meta–Vistra, Amazon–X-energy and Amazon–Talen, Google–Kairos — over 9.8 GW of announced tech-nuclear capacity by 2026. Data centres turned nuclear's steady megawatts into a premium product.
64 reactors operable, 37 under construction — nearly half the world's new build — and 10+ approvals a year for four years running. China is on track for ~100 GWe around 2030, overtaking the US fleet, and is locking up uranium from Kazakhstan to Namibia to feed it.
Japan's Kashiwazaki-Kariwa — the world's largest nuclear plant — returned to commercial operation in April 2026 after 14 years. Palisades in Michigan is poised to become the first-ever US restart of a shut-down reactor; Three Mile Island follows in 2027 with a $1B DOE loan. Spain just blinked first on its phase-out, extending Almaraz to 2030.
TerraPower's Natrium began nuclear-island construction in April 2026 — the first NRC construction permit for a commercial advanced reactor — with Oklo, X-energy/Dow and NuScale's Romanian project close behind. Four US test reactors reached criticality by July 2026. Nearly all of them run on HALEU nobody yet makes at scale.
For a decade after Fukushima, uranium was the market nobody wanted. Between 2023 and 2026 a coup, a price spike, a US–Russia decoupling, a tech-money stampede and a $2.7 billion enrichment programme turned the nuclear fuel chain into contested strategic territory.
A military junta topples the government of the world's No. 7 producer, then supplying a quarter of the EU's natural uranium. Export routes close, Orano's Imouraren licence is withdrawn (June 2024), production at Somaïr halts (Oct 2024) — and ~4–5% of world mine supply begins sliding off the market.
More than 20 countries pledge to triple world nuclear capacity by 2050 (31 signatories by COP29). Nine months later, 14 global banks — from Goldman Sachs to BNP Paribas — endorse the goal, reopening capital markets that had shunned nuclear for decades.
Kazatomprom warns sulfuric-acid shortages will hit production, and spot uranium spikes to ~$106/lb — the highest since 2007, nearly quadruple its level three years earlier. The signal is received: the fuel cycle has run out of slack.
The Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act bans Russian enriched uranium from August 2024, with waivers permitted only until 1 January 2028 — and unlocks $2.7B for domestic enrichment. Russia counter-restricts exports to the US in November. Two fuel chains begin to separate.
Microsoft signs a 20-year PPA to restart Three Mile Island Unit 1 for its data centres. Within weeks: Google orders SMRs from Kairos, Amazon backs X-energy with plans for 5 GW. The most demand-starved market in commodities suddenly has the world's richest buyers.
The French state champion declares loss of operational control of its Niger mine; the junta runs it and blocks ~1,000 t of yellowcake from leaving. Rosatom, meanwhile, quietly starts selling its Kazakh mine stakes to Chinese buyers.
Four executive orders target a quadrupling of US nuclear capacity to 400 GW by 2050, ten large reactors under construction by 2030, 18-month licensing caps and a domestic enrichment surge. An earlier Section 232 probe puts uranium imports under national-security review.
In one month: the World Bank lifts its ban on financing nuclear power (in place since the 1950s), Meta signs 20 years of Clinton's output, Amazon expands at Susquehanna to 1.92 GW — and Niger formally nationalises Somaïr, sending Orano to arbitration.
The WNA's Fuel Report projects requirements doubling to ~150,000 tU by 2040 and warns existing mines deplete from the mid-2030s. On 7 November, uranium — absent from the August draft — is added to the final 2025 US critical minerals list after a DOE push.
DOE awards $900M each to Centrus (HALEU), General Matter (HALEU at Paducah) and Orano (LEU at Oak Ridge). Spot uranium breaks back above $100/lb; Japan restarts Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, the world's largest plant. A Section 232 proclamation finds uranium imports a security threat — but orders negotiations, not tariffs.
Denison takes FID on Phoenix (Feb 24); NexGen's Arrow — the largest development-stage uranium project anywhere — wins final federal approval (Mar 5); TerraPower pours nuclear-island concrete (Apr); Urenco announces a 2.1M-SWU plant in New Mexico (Jun 2); Orano starts building Zuuvch-Ovoo in Mongolia (Jun).
The long-term price prints $95.50/lb — an all-time high for the series — with spot climbing to ~$90 as Kazakh delays bite. Urenco breaks ground at Eunice with the US Energy Secretary in attendance; Energy Fuels lands a conditional $725M defense loan; Spain extends Almaraz. The rebuild is now visibly under way — and still years from delivering.
Uranium has no exchange: it trades in bilateral contracts, with a thin spot market setting the headline price and long-term contracts moving the actual fuel. Since 2022 both have repriced violently — and the market has begun splitting into Western and Russia-China supply chains.
Only ~13% of US deliveries priced off spot in 2025. The long-term price climbed from $32/lb (2020) to $95.50/lb (Jul 2026) without a single down year — the clearest signal that utilities believe the shortage is structural.
The Sprott Physical Uranium Trust has hoovered up ~75 Mlb since 2021 (buying 8.67 Mlb in 2025 alone) and Yellow Cake holds another ~24 Mlb — together roughly 60% of a year's mine output, sequestered from the spot market indefinitely.
Utilities term-contracted ~160 Mlb in 2023 — the first replacement-rate year in a decade — but only ~110–116 Mlb in 2024–25. UxC estimates ~60% of 2030 requirements are still uncovered, and ~3.1 billion lb through 2045.
The scarcer steps moved most: enrichment hit a record ~$190/SWU spot (vs $56 three years earlier) and conversion rose ~230% in five years. Owning centrifuges, not pounds, was the trade of the decade.
Kazatomprom has led world supply since 2009 — every tonne from in-situ leaching, which needs vast amounts of sulfuric acid. Acid shortages forced repeated guidance cuts (2026: ~10%, to 27,500–29,000 tU), and its new acid plant has slipped to 2027–28. Ownership tells the geopolitical story: Cameco, Orano, Rosatom and Chinese state firms all hold stakes in Kazakh mines — but Rosatom is selling down to Chinese buyers, and the ramping Budenovskoye mine is committed to Russia through 2026. To reach Western customers without crossing Russia, 48% of 2025 deliveries went via the Trans-Caspian corridor — at five times the freight cost.
Uranium's concentration problem is double-jointed: one country dominates the ore, another dominates the step that turns it into fuel. And the buyer of last resort for new reactors — China — is building faster than everyone else combined.
of the world's uranium enrichment capacity belongs to Russia's Rosatom (WNA, 2025). Concentration along the mine-to-reactor chain:
Uranium is the only commodity whose supply chain is defined by weapons treaties. Every gram of traded material is safeguarded, every enrichment plant is a proliferation question — and the military and civilian fuel cycles have always fed each other.
From 1993 to 2013, 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium from ~20,000 dismantled Soviet warheads were downblended into reactor fuel — powering roughly 10% of US electricity for two decades. It was history's greatest swords-to-ploughshares programme, and it suppressed uranium mining for a generation.
Submarines and aircraft carriers run on compact reactor cores — US and UK boats on weapons-grade HEU, French ones on LEU. The AUKUS submarine pact made naval fuel a live policy issue in three capitals, and naval demand sits permanently outside the civilian market.
The same centrifuges that make 5% reactor fuel can make 90% weapons material — which is why enrichment technology is the most tightly guarded industrial secret on Earth, why IAEA safeguards track uranium by the gram, and why only a handful of countries are allowed to build capacity at all.
Enrichment's leftover tails — over a million tonnes worldwide — serve as armour plate, penetrators and radiation shielding, and are now a resource: startup General Matter plans to re-enrich the DOE tails cylinders stored at Paducah into fresh reactor fuel.
US warhead tritium is made in a civilian TVA power reactor — but treaty rules require it to run on unobligated, US-origin enriched uranium. That obscure constraint is one of the quiet drivers of Washington's rush to rebuild domestic enrichment.
The US holds a modest strategic uranium reserve (established 2020) and large DOE legacy inventories; Russia keeps state reserves; China is widely assessed to be stockpiling well beyond reactor needs. Uranium joined the US critical minerals list in November 2025 — decades after it first became strategic.
A decade of underinvestment left the fuel cycle short at every step just as demand inflected. Capital is now arriving at all of them at once — presented as observation, not investment advice.
NexGen's Arrow — approved March 2026, capacity up to ~30 Mlb/yr — is the biggest single supply addition on any horizon; Denison's Phoenix took FID in February 2026; CNNC put $321M into Bannerman's Etango; Orano committed ~$1.6B to Mongolia's Zuuvch-Ovoo. Almost none of it delivers before 2028–30.
The value moved downstream: DOE's $2.7B (Jan 2026) seeded Centrus, General Matter and Orano's US plants; Urenco is expanding on both sides of the Atlantic; Cameco's 49% of Westinghouse turned a miner into a fuel-cycle house. Conversion and SWU prices at records reward whoever owns the plumbing.
SPUT (~75 Mlb) and Yellow Cake (~24 Mlb) turned physical pounds into a listed asset class and put a floor under spot — SPUT's 2025 buying nearly tripled year on year. Utilities now compete with funds for the same drums of yellowcake.
Demand is policy-shaped and can reverse; restart juniors stumbled repeatedly (Boss, Peninsula, Lotus all cut or withdrew guidance in 2025–26); Kazatomprom retains swing capacity if acid arrives; secondary supplies and SPUT flows can whipsaw spot; and reactors, not headlines, ultimately set the burn rate.
Miners, converters and enrichers, developers and the physical funds. Two producers — Kazatomprom and Cameco — mine over half the world's uranium; four companies enrich nearly all of it. Filter by segment or search.
| Company | Segment | Key assets | Status & recent signals |
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No. Identified recoverable resources are around 6 million tonnes of uranium — roughly ninety years at current mining rates, with far more available at higher prices and in unconventional sources. The squeeze is about timing, not endowment: existing mines deplete significantly by the mid-2030s, a new mine takes ten to twenty years from discovery to production, and the World Nuclear Association projects reactor requirements will more than double to about 150,000 tonnes a year by 2040.
Kazakhstan mined about 25,800 of the world's roughly 62,000 tonnes of uranium in 2025 — around 41% — ahead of Canada (~13,400 t) and Namibia. But mining is only half the story: Russia controls about 43% of the world's enrichment capacity, the step every kilogram of reactor fuel must pass through.
Four companies — Rosatom, Urenco, CNNC and Orano — operate virtually all commercial enrichment capacity, and Rosatom alone holds about 43% of it. US utilities still bought 26% of their enrichment from Russia in 2025, even though a US import ban takes full effect in 2028 when waivers expire. That cliff triggered a $2.7 billion US enrichment programme and the largest Western capacity buildout in decades — but new centrifuge plants take years to come online.
The Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, signed in May 2024, banned Russian enriched uranium from August 2024 but allows waivers until 1 January 2028. Russia answered in November 2024 with its own restrictions on enriched-uranium exports to the US. The ban unlocked $2.7 billion for domestic enrichment, awarded in January 2026 to Centrus, General Matter, Orano and Global Laser Enrichment — yet Russian material still covered about a quarter of US enrichment purchases in 2025.
A reactor fleet that is growing again: 441 operable reactors (~404 GWe) with 79 under construction, 37 of them in China. AI data-centre power deals — Microsoft's Three Mile Island restart contract, Meta-Constellation, Amazon-X-energy, Google-Kairos, together more than 9 GW — turned big tech into a nuclear buyer, more than thirty countries have pledged to triple nuclear capacity by 2050, and the World Bank lifted its decades-old ban on financing nuclear power in June 2025.
Spot uranium hit about $106 per pound in early February 2024 — a sixteen-year high — after Kazatomprom warned that sulfuric-acid shortages would hit production, capping a run driven by supply cuts, the Sprott Physical Uranium Trust and post-2022 energy security fears. It fell back to $64 by March 2025, then recovered to about $90 by August 2026. The long-term contract price, where most uranium actually trades, kept climbing to a record $95.50 per pound — and enrichment and conversion prices set all-time records too.
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